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This essay begins to provide a unified moral reckoning with the way in which 
ideas concerning technological progress have altered the rules of military 
engagement and the implementation of homeland security. It will address 
both military technologies and technologies that secure the homeland, since 
the development and use of these technologies are vulnerable to the same 
ethical pitfalls. First, this essay employs Just War theory as a theoretical frame 
in which to situate the discussion and argues that the technology associated 
with precision guided munitions (PGM) only open the possibility of ethical 
discrimination and proportionality, but in no way insure that these 
possibilities will be actualized. Second, it begins to expose the relationship 
between the increasing popularity of PGM technology and the rhetoric that is 
used to describe contemporary military conflict. If precision weaponry is 
assumed to be inherently ethical, it may grant policymakers and strategists the 
chance to conflate the description of tactics with the prescription of normative 
judgements. Several case studies are employed to demonstrate this point. The 
second half of the paper asks if the technological progress that has come to 
define homeland security may lead to similar ethical difficulties in the fields of 
intelligence and law enforcement. It explores the way in which military 
technology and rhetoric might be redeployed in the domestic sphere.   
The questions concerning PGM and homeland security technologies and 
their moral implications are also “questions concerning technology” – an 
interrogation of the moral and epistemic assumptions that seem to accompany 
and validate technical capabilities. It is a question that strikes at the heart of 
homeland security. When Martin Heidegger delivered “The Question 
Concerning Technology” to a Bavarian audience in 1955, he spoke at a pivotal 
historical moment in which technological advancements were beginning to be 
confused with political imperatives and the moral justifications of war. Today, 
we face a similar moment.  The arms race of the Cold War may be over, but 
the danger that a blind faith in technological know-how poses to moral and 
rational sensibilities has never been as clear and present. In the end, this essay 
will suggest that technology itself neither answers nor ignores ethical 
questions; it is only the particular use of these technologies by practitioners 
that will either distract us from, or make us well attuned to, particular ethical 
questions concerning the rights and safety of the U.S. citizenry.        
A JUST WAR ON TERROR?  
The robust literature surrounding the issue of “just war” provides a helpful 
point of departure for a discussion of military technologies and their moral 
implications in homeland defence. This discussion will be employed later to 
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frame the discussion of homeland security. A brief review of Just War Theory 
may help to orient readers. Just War theory is usually addressed by way of two 
related constructs: jus ad bellum (justice in going to war) and jus in bello 
(justice at/in war).  
Having a just cause is the first step in deciding to wage a just war. Any act 
of aggression is regarded as an unjust act and warrants a military response. In 
this context, a just cause is one that may be regarded as an act of immediate 
self-defence. Due to the narrowness of this definition, it is often broadened to 
take into account pre-emptive actions that are aimed to avoid future 
aggressive actions by another party. This expansion of self-defence to include 
pre-emptive military action will prove to be a slippery topic in our later 
discussion of “national security” and will be important in the designation of 
potential threats by homeland security officials. The second mandate of jus ad 
bellum states that a just war ought to be waged only when there is a 
reasonable chance of achieving the objectives of the mission. These issues are 
negotiated in the coming section, which asks if there is a relationship between 
technical capabilities that might ostensibly achieve objectives (capabilities 
that have been dramatically improved in the past decade) and the ability to 
designate potential threats to national security (an ability of judgement that 
remains difficult to hone). We must ask whether an increase in technical 
abilities might encourage a more liberal, and perhaps inaccurate, assessment 
of “threat” and national security. Before elaborating on this point, however, a 
bit needs to be said in regard to jus in bello.   
Most scholars agree on at least two defining values associated with jus in 
bello: proportionality of means and precise discrimination. Proportionality 
generally refers to the degree to which military success is maximized through 
the use of minimal force. It is, at once, the demand to avoid unnecessary 
damage in any military strike. The definition of “just discrimination” is equally 
vague. Indeed, it flirts with a type of tautology, as seen in Dwight Roblyer’s 
description: “discrimination means the separation of individuals into two 
categories: those liable to be justly attacked and those who should be immune 
to attack.”1 More generally, discrimination refers to the separation between 
the military and the civilian, between targets and non-targets.2 The intent here 
is not to examine this distinction, but rather to notice the ways in which the 
advent of PGM seems to mask the ethical judgement that lies at the heart of 
this distinction. A similar examination will be conducted in reference to the 
“targeting” and monitoring of particular suspects who might threaten 
domestic security. First, let us take a careful look at the development of PGM 
in recent military engagement.   
It might seem that the capabilities of PGM answer the two imperatives of 
Just War quite adequately. During Operation Enduring Freedom (7 October, 
2001) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (19 March, 2003), the public saw an 
increasing number of photographs and film clips that seemed to reflect greater 
attention to these two Just War dicta. As of April, 2003, 80 percent of all 
bombs or missiles deployed by the U.S. Air Force in Operation Iraqi Freedom 
were guided by video camera, laser, or satellite targeting. In contrast, only 10 
percent of all munitions employed in Operation Dessert Storm were so-called 
precision guided munitions.3 Today, enemy targets appear to be targeted in 
highly populated areas with minimal collateral casualties; “smart bombs” 
enter windows and airshafts, seemingly detonating only where necessary. At 
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first glance, the “proof” of the munitions’ effectiveness and surgical precision 
seems to respond to the call for military discrimination and proportionality.   
First glances, however, can be deceptive. Precision guided munitions and 
remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) technology only opens the possibility of 
discrimination and military proportionality. Despite their “smartness,” bombs 
cannot discriminate. Ultimately, the distinctions between enemy and 
innocent, and the choices of military cost-benefit analysis, fall to the human 
beings that drive the “targeting cycle” of a given military campaign.4 This will 
be equally true in the case of homeland security officials in their attempt to 
identify suspects and conduct counterterrorism operations in the United 
States. This fact risks being obscured by the rhetoric of “progress” that 
surrounds advancement in military strike capabilities and in pinpoint 
surveillance technologies. As Michael Foley has noted, the “concept of 
progress has always suffered from a variety of logical and analytic problems 
which make it susceptible to ambiguity, disillusionment and abuse.”5 The 
relation between rhetorical ambiguity and technological progress will be 
brought out in the coming section, but a bit more needs to be said in relation 
to Foley’s observation.  The “abuse” that Foley cites arises when advancement 
in technology or know-how is not accompanied by corresponding efforts in 
ethics and political philosophy that might guide this advancement. In 
describing this abuse, Foley continues, “Progress in knowledge therefore 
resulted in proportionately less guidance over the direction to take it or which 
uses it should be served by it.”6  This tendency is reflected when progress in 
one venue, objective standards of casualty rate and destruction, are confused 
with normative standards of ethical justification.       
In light of this situation, the decisions for military planners and homeland 
security officials have become more difficult and more morally charged.  First, 
they must recognize the “abuse” hitherto described. Second, they must combat 
this abuse by redoubling their efforts to guide technical progress – instead of 
risking that technical progress might be allowed to guide moral sentiment. 
Finally, and to this end, they must recognize that the question is no longer one 
of sheer strike or surveillance capability, but rather one of dubious legitimacy. 
Granted, PGM helps avoid the catastrophic collateral damage that policy-
makers faced during conventional or nuclear weapons escalation during the 
Cold War.  However, as Dulles and Eisenhower pointed out in the early 1950s, 
the risk of Clausewitzian total war brought with it the practical constraints of 
self-preservation, often eliminating the role of moral choice in military 
planning.7 Very simply, there is no real moral quandary when confronted with 
the choice between cold peace and thermonuclear conflagration. On the other 
hand, the quandary emerges with unprecedented force when the stakes of a 
particular case of military targeting are considerably lower and are often 
leveraged against individuals and groups that do not share the same sense of 
self-preservation. Similarly, contemporary forms of surveillance and 
counterterrorism, employed in domestic security measures, are now, with the 
help of modern technology, becoming so subtle and unobtrusive that they can 
easily be used without the knowledge of a given population. Indeed, these 
technologies are effective only to the extent that they remain undetected by a 
given community. To put this point another way, in the past, one did not have 
to agonize over the ethical implications of homeland security technologies for 
one of two reasons – either these technologies did not exist or, if they existed, 
they could not be employed nearly as subtly as they are today. When the 
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abuses of security technologies were more obvious, more transparent to the 
public, the choice to use or not to use them was more clear-cut for law 
enforcement agents. Now that digital and biometric devices have come to 
supplement our surveillance repertoire, the technologies do exist and can be 
used without a public’s knowledge.  This is the point where ethical debate 
concerning these issues ought to take root.   
THE “PROGRESS” OF PGM AND SURVEILLANCE  
Ironically, wars often become a viable, although questionably ethical, option 
when nation-states amass low-yield, precision-guided weaponry. A recent 
report issued by the Institute for International Strategic Studies suggests that 
PGM technology may lower the threshold that currently limits a state’s 
military action.8  In this case, military action may become the primary option, 
rather than the last resort, of foreign policy.  This case seems to have emerged 
in recent U.S. actions in the Middle East and elsewhere. It seems not only 
possible, but also probable, that faith in the military modernization process 
allowed policy makers the chance to downplay alternative forms of soft power 
that might have been used in affecting change in particular territories.  Soft 
power, as defined by Joseph Nye, is “co-optive” power – the ability to alter 
another’s purposes by non-coercive means;9 as E.H. Carr notes in The Twenty 
Years’ Crisis, it is the “power over opinion.”10 The tendency to downplay this 
form of co-optive power in favor of the impressive coercive force of PGM is 
illustrated in the case of former Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, a 
staunch advocate of the use of PGM, who is quoted by Nye as admitting that 
he didn’t know what the term “soft power” meant.11 Similarly, we might ask if 
the alternatives to technologically advanced, and subtly invasive, homeland 
security measures that jeopardize civil rights will be overlooked if policy 
makers become mesmerized by the capabilities of technology.   
Turning to the issue of homeland defence, if we use the metric of 
unintended destructive force in order to evaluate the effectiveness and ethical 
standing of military strikes, it seems that PGM fits the bill quite nicely.  
However, while besieged populations may not be directly effected by the blast 
of a surgical air strike, the social, economic and humanitarian aftershocks of 
frequent PGM strikes may have lasting effects on the people of a surrounding 
area and the psychological landscape of the besieged population. As several 
commentators have highlighted, the societal upheaval following a military 
attack can take a real and deadly toll.12 This is especially important if the 
intent of PGM use is to win military conflict, but also not to loose the “hearts 
and minds” of a given population.   
Many policymakers claim that the risks of adjusting and lowering military 
thresholds are outweighed by the advantages of employing PGM in 
asymmetric conflicts in which particular objects and – more poignantly – 
particular individuals are liquidated with minimum “innocent losses.” As the 
most recent conflict in Iraq has shown, such losses are still taken, albeit on a 
smaller scale. Human error still occurs.  In the case of both homeland defence 
and homeland security, the ethical question of their implementation turns on 
the matter of human error. This point, however, is occasionally lost in the on-
going attempt to increase technical capabilities. These capabilities are 
confused with ethical justification. For example, precision-guided munitions 
expanded the repertoire of strategic planners, including practices that were 
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hitherto excluded from the realm of Just War. Pre-emptive strike and the 
elimination of individuals with questionable military standing are becoming 
tools of standard U.S. military procedure. When Hellfire missiles can be 
launched from “standoff positions,” targeting the cars of enemy military 
leaders, the art of war may quickly become the art of political assassination or 
summary execution.13 It is true that these martial tools have a long history, but 
never have military planers and policymakers had to pay so very little to 
employ them. Precision guided munitions are used, at least in part, to avoid 
the loss of clandestine military ground forces and seem to answer the question 
of collateral damage. Both of these points may provide strategists and 
politicians carte blanche to target “potentially dangerous” individuals, to 
practice a form of selective targeting of questionable legality. This possibility 
needs to be confronted head on by policy makers and academics. The 
aforementioned practice  is illegal under the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, the UN Principles on Effective Prevention and 
Investigation of the Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, and 
Article 147 of the 4th Geneva Convention. We must weigh security against 
legal standing without allowing the story of technological progress to 
dominate the discussion of ethical norms.   
John Yoo, who supports the successful targeting of the Hussein brothers in 
downtown Mosul, objects to this point, arguing that such surgical strike 
attacks should not be confused with illegitimate assassination:  
As Hugo Grotius, the father of international law, observed in 1646, ‘It 
is permissible to kill an enemy.’ Legitimate military targets include not 
just foot soldiers, but the command and control structure of an 
enemy's military, leading up to its commander in chief.14 
Grotius may be right. It may be permissible to kill an “enemy.” For Grotius, 
however, the question of specificity in military targeting could be answered 
rather easily.  In On the Law of War and Peace, he adopts Livy’s position, that 
“war is declared against the sovereign, and all within his jurisdiction."15 This 
sovereign-centered approach to targeting, however, seems unhelpful and 
unrealistic as non-state actors emerge as the primary threat to international 
security.16 Yoo surely recognizes this fact, yet fails to address a question that 
arises from these shifting security circumstances: In the age of asymmetric 
warfare and precision guided weaponry, who exactly is the “enemy?”  
Ironically, but not coincidently, the definition of “enemy” has become 
increasingly vague as the weaponry to deal with this ambiguous foe has 
become increasingly precise.  This correlation is in no way arbitrary and is 
fraught with moral concerns.   
Unfortunately, legal precedent is not extremely helpful in resolving the 
aforementioned situation. The rules of Hague Convention IV (1907) deal with 
counterinsurgency and revolutionary conflicts only in setting forth the 
conditions of belligerent status in Article 1. As William O’Brien notes, 
“Historically, the Hague Conventions were concerned with interstate, and the 
problems of unconventional war, even as a part of international conventional 
conflict, were not seriously addressed.”17 In light of the issues surrounding the 
use of unconventional force in World War II and Vietnam, it is surprising and 
disturbing that the Geneva Convention of 1949 and Geneva Protocol II of 1977 
do not do a much better job of addressing the situation.   
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In his analysis of jus in bello in asymmetric engagement, David Rodin 
suggests that the increasing vagueness in military targeting is precisely the 
trend that must be counteracted if the principles of Just War are to be upheld.  
In so doing, he begins to revise the legal understanding of unconventional 
conflict and Just War Theory. He notes that as asymmetries arise, stronger 
military powers must assume a greater burden of proof in validating targeting 
techniques. For example,  
Western powers have historically considered dual use facilities to be 
legitimate military targets, but a more stringent interpretation of jus in 
bello (one that could be applied in the case of asymmetric conflict) 
would place all ambiguous targets and dual-use facilities that have 
important civilian functions off-limits for attack.18  
Instead of emphasizing the stringency of Just War norms, an uncritical faith 
in precision technology, in its ability to discriminate, in its concern for the 
innocent, has occasionally allowed strategists and policymakers to employ 
vague rhetoric and fuzzy categories in defining enemy positions. A brief case 
study illuminates this point.        
TECHNOLOGICAL KNOW-HOW AND THE AMBIGUOUS 
RHETORIC OF CONFLICT 
Before the attacks of September 11, 2001, before the subsequent U.S. War on 
Terror, Gordon Graham made a prescient observation on the nature of enemy 
designation and targeting: “‘Terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ are not descriptive 
words.  They do not pick one sort of thing about which we might ask whether 
it is good or bad, but in themselves, serve to condemn whatever causes and 
methods the user of these words disapproves of.”19 This goes for the 
description of both international and domestic “terrorism.” Today, these 
ambiguous, but powerful, watchwords dominate the discourse of U.S. 
international policy and have percolated into military targeting – targeting 
that is increasingly executed by PGM. Similarly, these words dominate the 
surveillance targeting of homeland security programs. This section will 
address the relation between the ambiguity of targeting language and the 
specificity of targeting execution. The literature on the rhetorical strategies 
President George W. Bush, Vice-President Cheney, and former Secretary 
Rumsfeld is well documented and underscores the possible moral 
shortcomings of these strategies.20 Many of these accounts, however, overlook 
the way in which the development of highly specific weaponry and 
surveillance technologies have allowed – and indeed encouraged – the current 
administration to maintain its position in the War on Terror. This refers to the 
war at home and the war abroad. The use of this technology will not be unique 
to this administration and will continue to affect the deployment of particular 
rhetorical strategies.    
The vital connection between the deployment of a technologically advanced 
military and the deployment of a general and ideologically-charged rhetoric 
became explicit in the fall of 2001. In the following statement, President Bush 
moves seamlessly from addressing military capacities to broad moral 
justification for implementing them:   
I have faith in our military.  And we have got a job to do – just like the 
farmers and ranchers and business owners and factory workers have a 
job to do.  My administration has a job to do, and we're going to do 
KAAG, ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS VOLUME IV, NO. 1 (JANUARY 2008) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
 
7 
it.  We will rid the world of the evil-doers.  We will call together 
freedom loving people to fight terrorism…we've never seen this kind of 
evil before. But the evildoers have never seen the American people in 
action before, either - and they're about to find out.21 
The slippage between capabilities and moral justification is enabled by the 
misguided belief that precise military action is inherently ethical. Is it 
appropriate for a “faith” in military-based surgical strike capabilities to grant 
policy makers confidence in their moral prerogative to “rid the world of evil-
doers?”     
Rumsfeld, a long-time proponent of PGM and RPV technology has also, not 
coincidently, been quick to provide broad-stroke, ethical justification for 
military strikes. At a 2003 press conference, the former secretary of defence 
stated:    
Our military capabilities are so devastating and precise that we can 
destroy an Iraqi tank under a bridge without damaging the bridge. We 
do not need to kill thousands of innocent Iraqis to remove Saddam 
Hussein from power. At least that's our belief. We believe we can 
destroy his institutions of power and oppression in an orderly 
manner.22 
Rumsfeld opens with an assessment of technical military superiority that rests 
on the advancement of precision munitions. From these premises, however, 
he concludes that this superiority can be transferred to the moral realm, that 
technical precision can accurately “target” the meaning of “innocence,” 
“oppression” and “order.” This conflation between analytic description of 
capabilities and moral prescription is dangerous in its subtlety and stands as 
an ethical dilemma born from the development of PGM and other security 
technologies. For Rumsfeld, the “can” of security competencies implies an 
“ought” that is rarely examined in terms of stringent ethical guidelines. Rodin 
suggests that the tables ought to be turned when considering a nation’s 
response to asymmetric threats: 
Pentagon and UK Ministry of Defence spokespeople never tire of 
telling us of the laser guided precision munitions and astonishing 
intelligence gathering capabilities at their disposal. Because Western 
powers have capabilities not possessed by weaker groups that enable 
them to achieve military ends with lower levels of collateral damage, it 
does not seem unreasonable to require them to do so.23   
While I believe that Rodin’s point is overstated and somewhat unrealistic, his 
general thrust – that U.S. policymakers and strategists must shoulder even 
greater responsibility in the targeting process – seems right. Instead of 
inspiring over-confidence, the revolution of military affairs (RMA) should give 
us ethical pause.    
To this point, the discussion has focused on the moral difficulties that are 
raised in the refinement and the employment of PGM technologies. These 
difficulties are bound to be exploited by those individuals and groups who do 
seek to attack a highly mechanized military such as that of the United States.  
As a result, PGM targeting will only become more problematic. In light of this 
possibility, it seems wise to provide morally sound alternatives to the current 
coupling of fuzzy categories and precise surgical strike capabilities, 
alternatives that would allow strategists to avoid overstepping the bounds of 
international law. Steps are being made in this direction.   
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In Operation Enduring Freedom, the Department of Defence demanded 
that legal advisors be present at every stage of the targeting cycle to insure 
that commanders and strategists adhered to international law. U.S. Air Force 
legal reports indicate that military planners were, on the whole, “overly 
cautious” when faced with the responsibility of initiating strikes, a 
responsibility made more acute by the use of PGM. These reports also indicate 
that such hesitancy may, in fact, prolong human suffering by extending the 
duration of military operations.24 This assessment, however, stands against 
most evaluations of PGM targeting. While the presence of legal advisors in the 
targeting process is sure to alleviate some of the moral concerns surrounding 
PGM, it may provide policy-makers a false sense of ethical legitimacy.    
THE MORAL SHOCKWAVE OF TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES 
It is worth noting that all military targeting, and particularly PGM targeting, 
begins with precise intelligence gathering and the methods employed therein.  
Legal expertise must be brought to bear on these methods as well and should 
dovetail with a study of precision guided munitions. “Painting” and destroying 
specific enemy targets with laser-guided precision often depends on the 
reliability of intelligence garnered from the interrogation and coercion of 
enemy prisoners. The demands of PGM targeting, the need to specify an 
enemy’s exact position and character, may place undue burden on 
interrogators who feel responsible for providing this information.   
This is not to suggest that PGM technology is a direct cause of 
informant/prisoner abuse; it surely is not.  It is possible, however, that the 
effort to implement effective PGM strikes may indirectly encourage moral 
crises in other areas of the armed forces. If we give priority to the accurate 
targeting of enemy combatants, which seems like a reasonable priority, we 
may have to go to extreme measures to glean proper intelligence.  The pursuit 
of one moral outcome (discrimination in the targeting cycle) may force us to 
give up others (proper interrogation procedures and not detaining suspects 
without legal mandate). This is not to set up unrealistic or impossible 
standards for the homeland security or homeland defense official, it is only to 
underscore the relatedness of various ethical issues. This is the moral 
“shockwave” of the revolution of military affairs and the ever-advancing forms 
of security technology.   
A final shockwave of security and defence technologies needs to be 
addressed, for it will only continue to reverberate as technological know-how 
drives the trends of the revolution in military affairs and homeland security.  
Commentators often discuss the way in which surgical strike technology helps 
strategists avoid civilian collateral damage. Similarly, pinpoint domestic 
intelligence is lauded for avoiding the “blanket approach” to surveillance that 
might eviscerate the civil rights of an entire population. Additionally, the use 
of PGM and RPV arguably reduces the risks to military personnel in many 
engagements. Similarly, anti-terrorist technologies employed in the 
“homeland” are meant to protect security agents in the field. It is fair to 
celebrate both of these points – and celebrate them earnestly.  This being said, 
it seems wise to address the way in which limiting troop losses might affect the 
duration and execution of wars. Similarly, it seems wise to address the way in 
which protecting field agents might affect the objectives and duration of a 
domestic security program. Would a prolonged War on Terror be possible 
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without the technological know-how of the 21st century? How does 
technological capability, rather than sustained and democratic discourse, 
determine the shape and duration of this war? While a detailed study is 
beyond the scope of this essay, a few questions are warranted.  First, what is 
the relation between troop losses and public support of a particular conflict?  
Do constant, yet low-frequency, losses – the kind of losses that are suffered in 
guerrilla warfare in which PGM are currently used – insulate strategists and 
policymakers from a democratic outcry that might affect the course of a 
conflict? To what extent is this development beneficial? While surgical strike 
capabilities allow military and security planners to do their jobs effectively, is 
there a type of technological-institutional inertia that may encourage an 
uncritical acceptance of current tactics? Finally, what are the fiscal and 
budgetary considerations of PGM and surveillance technologies? Will 
technological progress in security programs, developed to protect liberal 
ideals, outstrip a nation’s ability to provide liberal institutions to its citizens?    
In all of these questions, it is necessary to remember that it is not the 
advancement of technology that is question begging, but rather the purposeful 
use of this technology by moral agents that must be re-interrogated.    
In 1947, at the dawning of the nuclear age, President Truman set forth a 
goal that remains elusive:   
We must catch up morally and internationally with the machine age. 
We must catch up with it, and we must catch up with it in such a way 
as to create peace in the world, or it will destroy us and everybody else. 
And that we don't dare to contemplate.25    
In 2004, at the dawning of another military era, the “machine age” continues 
to outstrip our moral practices and ethical sensitivities. While the use of 
precision-guided munitions seems to satisfy the longstanding mandates of 
Just War, in fact, it only complicates the moral standing of armed conflict. In 
short, precision-guided munitions create as many ethical dilemmas as they 
solve. Policy-makers and military strategists may forgo the target of morality 
at an ironic moment, at a moment when precision weaponry seems to grant 
them the clearest shot.    
HOMELAND SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES: WHEN “NEW” MIGHT 
NOT ALWAYS BE BETTER 
How does the discussion of the ethical ramifications of PGM bear on the issue 
of homeland security? This question seems important to the extent that the 
technologies employed abroad in the War on Terror have also defined the 
rhetoric and practice of domestic security. As the National Research Council 
noted in a 2003 report on homeland security technologies, “The science and 
technology required by the Army for Homeland Security need not be unique. 
The science and technology work already being done for the Objective Force 
(HD) could provide much of the technology needed for Homeland Security”26 
Before proceeding, it is necessary to note that this discussion addresses 
homeland security only in its capacity to implement counter-terrorism 
measures. In short, it assumes the “strict constructionist” perspective that 
Christopher Bellavita describes as a position that echoes the traditional 
understanding of homeland security in the National Strategy.27       
That being said, this analysis of homeland security technologies will 
address three interrelated issues and may provide a helpful model for future 
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investigation. First it will briefly address establishment of a specialized branch 
of DHS that focuses on technology research and development. A comment on 
the growth of this branch, coupled with several observations concerning the 
2001 U.S. Patriot Act, will provide the rationale for examining both the 
technological advancements in the Revolution in Military Affairs and 
homeland security. Second, the discussion will examine the SAFETY Act of 
2002 that was established to encourage research and development in “anti-
terrorist technologies.” Third, it will evaluate the potential synergy between 
surveillance and biometric technologies in the project of homeland security. 
All of these evaluations resonate closely with the earlier discussion of PGM to 
the extent that impressive technological capabilities may continue to be 
conflated with our ability to make normative judgements concerning 
innocence, guilt, and threat.   
So where does the technology of homeland security come from? Many 
people would have trouble answering this question – perhaps even a few 
people who work in the bureaucratic monster of DHS. The answer to this 
question is complicated, but a good place to start is the Science and 
Technology Directorate of DHS. The directorate is lauded as one of the great 
success stories of the War on Terror.  It is also a story that is often not told to 
the public and the details of which are often omitted. The anonymity of the 
directorate’s scientists and the secrecy of its projects are necessary safeguards 
in order to maintain the effectiveness of security technology employment, but 
have the unintended consequences of fuelling Orwellian suspicions 
concerning technology and precluding open discussion concerning the ethical 
implications of the use of these technologies. The directorate was established 
in the winter of 2003 and was modelled loosely after the Pentagon’s Defence 
Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) and the technology directorate 
at the CIA. Many members of the DHS directorate were trained in one of these 
two organizations. DARPA serves as the technological dynamo of the armed 
forces, providing soldiers in the field with the latest military tools. The 
technology directorate of the CIA is responsible for supporting field officers 
and intelligence analysts with technologically advanced means of 
counterterrorism and intelligence gathering. Here, it begins to make more 
sense why a discussion of the ethics of war might serve as an appropriate 
preface to the ethics of domestic security technology. The ethical blind spots in 
one arena of strategy may be imported into DHS policies. There are also 
powerful resonances between the rhetoric of war and the rhetoric of 
protecting the homeland by way of technological innovation that might give us 
pause.   
In 2001, John Ashcroft described the two inter-related principles of the 
PATRIOT Act, stating that the first was “the airtight surveillance of terrorists” 
and the second was to increase the speed in “tracking down and intercepting 
terrorists.” After employing the loose term of “terrorists” to identify threats to 
national security, Ashcroft gets to the very particular means of achieving this 
goal. His comment bears directly on the discussion of the ethical risks implicit 
in employing security technologies.   
Law enforcement officials will begin to employ new tools that will ease 
administrative burdens and delays in apprehending terrorists…Agents 
will be directed to take advantage of new, technologically neutral 
standards for intelligence gathering. 28  
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Several points deserve to be underscored in this passage. First, it seems 
reasonable to expect that many of the “new tools” to which Ashcroft refers 
have their roots in techne, in the instruments (both physical and legal) that 
law enforcement officials can employ. “New” is not necessarily better, or more 
ethical. A long and sincere discussion is warranted in order to address the 
relationship between these new tools, oftentimes defined by their impressive 
technical capabilities, and the “administrative burdens” that Ashcroft sought 
to avoid. The term “administration” refers to a thoughtful human process that 
is shot through with normative claims and assumptions. Administration refers 
to a process of human judgment that is burdened with responsibility.  
Administration can never be substituted or “unburdened” by the mere use of 
new tools. Tools should be used, but must be used in the right way.   
Second, it ought to be noted that the delay in apprehending criminals, a 
delay that Ashcroft wanted to avoid, has never simply been a matter of raw 
capability. It is equally a matter of judgement and due process. This fact needs 
to be considered carefully; as capabilities increase, it cannot be the case that 
due process and responsibility are abandoned in pursuing the siren calls of 
technological progress and security.   
The appeal of technology need not be siren call – but it often is. This danger 
lurks in the background as Ashcroft reflects on his belief in “new, 
technologically neutral standards” of security implementation. The belief in 
the neutrality and objectivity of technology leads us away from meaningful 
discussions and debates concerning the ethicality of technology’s use. It 
encourages us to forget that progress in the technical realm does not 
necessarily translate into the advancement of ethics or justice. The use of 
technology is never neutral. The creation of technology is never neutral. The 
ends of technology are never neutral. They are always part and parcel of the 
interests of individuals and groups that should be discussed, and in many 
cases, hotly debated. Additionally, Ashcroft’s elision of “neutral standards” 
and technology seems more at home in the Scottish Enlightenment of the 
1700s than in the political mindset of the United States in the 21st century.  
Standards are, almost by definition, not neutral. A standard is always a 
standard in reference to some point of view or to some agreed upon 
benchmark. This situation is question begging: If one forgets that standards 
are human measurements rather than unalterable technological products, 
does this effectively overlook the debate that might alter and revise these 
standards?  This question emerges in the rhetoric of homeland security, but 
also in the legislation surrounding the development of new security 
technologies.   
The Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies (SAFETY) 
Act of 2002 provides legal liability protection to the providers of qualified 
anti-terrorist technology. In his Congressional testimony in 2006, Jay Cohen 
describes SAFETY:  
These (liability) protections apply to companies when the worst 
happens – an act of terrorism. The SAFETY Act is intended to ensure 
that the threat of liability does not deter potential sellers or 
manufactures of anti-terrorism technologies from creating or 
providing products and services that could save lives.29  
It is worth noting that Cohen’s testimony was given four years after the 
SAFETY Act was accepted by DHS.  Indeed, SAFETY did not receive a hearing 
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in either chamber of the legislature and was inserted into the Homeland 
Security Bill late in the legislative process when it was observed that the 
indemnification processes considered earlier would not suffice. The 
implementation of SAFETY is of concern for at least three reasons that 
coincide with the earlier discussion of PGM technologies.  
First, the “anti-terrorist technologies” under the SAFETY act include 
information security systems, biometric devices, surveillance networks and 
perimeter intrusion detection devices. Biometric technologies potentially link 
the legal identities of visitors and U.S. citizens with their physical 
characteristics. The technical specificity and cost effectiveness of these 
products have dramatically increased in recent years. For example, 
surveillance technologies have become more efficient through the use of GPS 
and have become smaller, and hence more easily concealed. While this fact 
makes them more “effective,” they potentially jeopardize some of the civil 
liberties that U.S. citizens have long enjoyed under the Fourth Amendment.  
These “products” also include the services that may support anti-terrorist 
technologies, services that might not be regulated by pre-existing guidelines.  
Second, the technical specificity of these products has come hand-in-hand 
with an ambiguity in the language that is used to explain and justify these 
technologies. The SAFETY Act itself reflects this ambiguity in the sense that it 
is unclear whether the act provides “safety” to U.S. citizens or to sellers and 
vendors of anti-terrorist technologies who wish to be shielded from liability 
litigation. Cohen suggests that this act is necessary since it “saves lives,” but he 
avoids addressing the costs of SAFETY on the lives and liberties of visitors and 
citizens. These costs might begin to be highlighted in a discussion of the way 
in which SAFETY could transform the common law doctrine of “government 
contractor defence” which hitherto limited the liability of sellers of contracted 
technologies to the U.S. government. Under this law, the government issued 
the specifications for the product and the manufacturer met these 
specifications with full disclosure.  SAFETY, as written in 2002, begins to do 
away with this procedure. Under SAFETY, companies submit the 
specifications of their products and, if approved, earn a rebuttable 
presumption in future liability cases that can be overcome only by proof that 
the company acted fraudulently in the submission of these specifications.  One 
might ask, in this case, who exactly is liable if the employment of “anti-
terrorist” technologies does result in harm to the lives and liberties of U.S. 
citizens?  
It appears that DHS might be willing to limit citizens’ ability to present 
grievances in an attempt to curtail excessive tort litigation in the instance of 
anti-terrorist technologies. Recent developments in the SAFETY Final Rule 
(2006) indicate that it might also be willing to accelerate the testing and 
regulation cycles of these technologies.30 When considered in tandem, these 
two comments ought to give us pause – if not a cause for genuine alarm.  Is 
the loosening of tort litigation and the accelerating of product testing a viable 
long-term solution for the maintenance of homeland security? 
To this point, this essay has not addressed specific technologies, but only 
discussed the ways of thinking and talking about their use. It has addressed 
the ethical blind spots that might characterize the use of security technologies 
without describing any specific homeland security measures. Two such 
measures will be addressed in conclusion: thermal resonance imagining and 
the Internet surveillance programs, Carnivore and Magic Lantern.31   
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The U.S. military, in night reconnaissance, targeting, and combat in 
obscure conditions, has used thermal imaging for many decades. This 
technology allows soldiers in the field to literally see through walls by 
detecting the thermal resonance of potential enemy combatants. Similar 
technologies are used in missile guidance systems that employ heat-seeking 
devices. This technology is beginning to “come home” in new ways, to be 
redeployed on the domestic front in the War on Terror. Implementation is in 
its early stages, but the implications of this technology should be confronted 
now. Thermal imaging can allow field officers to see a suspect hiding in the 
dark; it has recently been suggested that the same imaging can allow officers 
to see inside a suspect’s head.32   
When a person is upset, anxious or aroused, blood rushes to the face and 
particularly the eyes.  This physiological effect can be detected on a thermal 
image. The eyes “light up” on the image. This technology has been developed 
in interrogation scenarios and now supports the most innovative lie-detection 
devices. Thermal imaging technology, however, is beginning to make its way 
out of the interrogation room and into U.S. customs, at the major points of 
entry to the United States. It is used to screen individuals who might attempt 
to enter the country with false documentation, assuming that these 
individuals will be more agitated than their fellow passengers. This practice 
may prove ethically problematic in the coming years. After our discussion of 
precision guided munitions, it goes almost without saying that in the case of 
detecting physiological effects, thermal resonance imaging can neither help 
officials judge the motives of a person nor determine the causes of a subject’s 
anxiety. Indeed, these devices are not very accurate in determining the 
difference between anxiety and general arousal.  
The members of the Israeli intelligence service and law enforcement 
agencies have become quite adept at detecting lies in potential terrorists. They 
did not achieve success by way of thermal imaging, but through a careful study 
of, and prolonged exposure to, the suspect’s behaviour. Officials engage in 
extended conversations with subjects and then make a judgement concerning 
the truth or falsity of the subject’s story.33 This naturalized approach to lie-
detection is an art form that is time-intensive and takes into account semantic, 
emotional, syntactical, and bodily cues. It is a holistic approach to lie-
detection that cannot be approximated by an analysis of the thermal image of 
a subject’s face. Thermal imaging seems to be a good first line of defence, but 
the discussion of PGM indicates that there may be a tendency to become 
mesmerized by the technological capabilities of these devices and allow them 
to take the place of human judgement subject to ethical evaluations. In short, 
we run the risk of developing a false confidence in this sort of technology. 
With this confidence may come a kind of complacency in our ability to make 
judgements – both ethical and practical.       
The discrete character of thermal imaging cameras will eventually allow 
this sort of screening to be accomplished without disrupting the subjects of 
the investigation. This is a beneficial development, but it also raises questions 
concerning the legality and ethicality of these types of monitoring devices: are 
these “mental searches” ethically viable alternatives if subjects do not submit 
to them? Will these approaches be used more frequently as their subtlety and 
discreteness increases? Is this direct correlation a cause for concern?   
A similar set of question might be posed in reference to what Etzioni calls 
“public protective technologies” that have recently been developed to regulate 
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and screen the uses of the Internet.34 In 2000, the FBI unveiled Carnivore, a 
computer program designed to sift through the stream of many millions of 
messages between individuals who may, or may not, be engaging in criminal 
activity. As Etzioni notes, many ISPs do this sifting themselves and pass along 
information to authorities when a warrant is obtained. If the ISP is not able to 
do this, however, Carnivore is.35 Carnivore’s filters are set in accordance with 
legal court orders, but these filters are necessarily general and include the 
communications of many other users than just the suspects. Despite 
Carnivore’s breadth (the ability to filter millions of messages in a short period 
of time), it lacks depth (the ability to break encrypted code, the likes of which 
are used in many electronic correspondences).36 This is where Magic Lantern 
comes in. As compared to “keystroke capture” devices such as the Key Logger 
System (KLS), which have to be manually (and covertly) installed on a 
suspect’s computer, this device is considerably less invasive. Like the Key 
Logger System, it does not decrypt particular emails, but grants authorities 
access to a suspect’s password. Instead of placing additional hardware on a 
subject’s computer, as does KLS, Magic Lantern allows the FBI to place 
software on a computer by way of a virus-like program. Just like a virus, Magic 
Lantern can be imported into a suspect’s computer by way of the Internet. The 
American Civil Liberties Union compares the use of both of these devices to 
agents ripping “open each and every mail bag and search for one person’s 
letters” and tapping an entire phone system instead of targeting just one 
caller.37   
CONCLUSION 
The advent of highly specific technologies, often employed for the screening of 
people, their communications with others, and patterns in their behaviour, 
leads us back to the issue of “targeting” which rested at the centre of the 
debate concerning PGM. While military targeting in homeland defence 
departs in significant respects from the “targeting” or identification of 
particular individuals who jeopardize homeland security, certain similarities 
warrant discussion as Homeland Security and the SAFETY Act take shape in 
the coming years. As suggested in the sections focusing on precision-guided 
munitions, as the political, material, and economic costs of employing 
technologies declines, the prevalence and frequency of their use tends to 
increase regardless of the ethical implications.  Indeed, the sheer utility and 
effectiveness of security technologies may seem to make discussions 
concerning their ethical use almost superfluous. Even in light of judicial 
oversight and warrant requirements, analytic descriptions of capabilities are 
often conflated with normative prescriptions or designations. This rationale 
may prevail in homeland security if the reason to “target” citizens and visitors 
is reduced to the fact that it is easy to do so with the help of affordable 
precision technologies. Technical capabilities appear ethical in their ease of 
use, their precision, and their cost-effectiveness. Such appearances, however, 
should not deceive us. The first step in initiating an ethical discussion 
concerning security technologies is to recognize that there are ethical 
decisions to make, that technology itself cannot answer these questions, and 
that these questions deepen and multiply as technological capabilities 
increase.    
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In outlining the PATRIOT Act, the attorney general stated that he planned 
to “shine the light of justice” on wrongdoers. This essay has suggested that the 
light to which Ashcroft refers does not necessarily emanate from “justice,” but 
from highly specific technologies that may be easily masked in the rhetoric of 
justice. When Martin Heidegger gave his lecture on “The Question Concerning 
Technology” in 1955, his main concern was the way in which technological 
know-how may come to dominate the entire field of human knowledge and 
judgement. He suggests that technology is a “way of revealing,” a way of 
ordering things to “stand by,” a way of putting things and people “on call for a 
further ordering.”38 This suggestion strikes at the heart of Ashcroft’s 
understanding of shining the light of justice on potential terrorists.  Many 
security technologies, used in either just or unjust projects, place people “on 
call for a further ordering” and demand that they stand by or stand trial.  The 
risk involved in the use of modern technology in homeland security is that it 
may overshadow other forms of reflective judgement, and that its impressive 
capabilities may distract us from the sobering discussion of ethics. In a 
commentary on Heidegger’s lecture, David Krell states that the “question 
concerning technology confronts the supreme danger, which is that this one 
way of revealing beings may overwhelm man and beings and all other possible 
ways of revealing.”39 Krell and Heidegger are onto something here. There is a 
supreme danger that technological ways of revealing will become synonymous 
with “shining the light of justice” on potential enemies. There is the danger of 
confusing technical capabilities and just norms.        
At this point it seem wise to return to the ethical balancing act that Ashcroft 
outlined in his comment after September 11, 2001: “We always have to be 
careful that the rights which America stands for are protected, but we also 
have to understand that in order for those rights to be enjoyed, they have to be 
protected.”40 Security technologies, however, do not help us negotiate the dual 
commitment of rights and protection. Indeed, the fact that technological 
“progress” risks becoming equated to ethical progress will make moral 
questions harder to frame and harder to answer. We must hone our ethical 
senses and sensibilities in order to keep up with the technical know-how that 
broadens the field of possible strategic choices.     
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